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[Abstract] 
This paper investigates the determinants of advertising intensity at the firm level by 
focusing on the role of foreign entry. In a monopolistically competitive market with 
heterogeneous firms, we show that foreign entry affects the expected advertising 
intensity of domestic firms through its impact on the cost of resources, brand image, 
and productivity spillovers and its impact on firms’ exit behaviour. Then, using 
comprehensive firm-level data from China’s manufacturing sector between 2005 and 
2007, we test this hypothesis and find that foreign entry significantly affects 
advertising intensity. 
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1. Introduction 
Researchers have investigated firm advertising behaviour from various perspectives. 
For example, Bertrand et al. (2010) explore how advertising affects demand. One 
strand of this research focuses on determinants of advertising behaviour. 
Understanding why firms advertise and what determines a firm’s advertising 
behaviour is crucial in that it has implications for both policy makers and business 
managers. Contributing to this strand, this paper will explore the determinants of firm 
advertising intensity in China. 
 
This paper differs from previous studies in three aspects. First, we identify 
determinants of firm advertising behaviour using a comprehensive firm-level dataset, 
whereas many previous studies have employed industry-level data. Firms covered in 
the dataset used for this study account for over 85 per cent of the industrial outputs in 
the Chinese manufacturing sector. Using such a comprehensive, disaggregated dataset 
allows a detailed examination of what factors affect firm advertising behaviour and 
avoids information loss caused by aggregation. 
 
Second, we investigate the impact of foreign entry2 on firm advertising behaviour. 
Foreign entry has been shown to affect the domestic economy in a number of ways. 
For example, Richardson (1998) shows that foreign entry affects domestic welfare. 
Fang and Richardson (2010) demonstrate that foreign entry tends to increase both 
private and public incentives for domestic mergers. Since Caves (1974), a significant 
body of research has been devoted to measuring the impact of FDI on the productivity 
                                               
2 Hereafter, foreign entry is synonymous with foreign direct investment (FDI) and the presence of 
foreign firms. 
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of domestic firms (see, for example, Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Saggi, 2002; Gorg 
and Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008 for surveys). The presence of foreign firms is 
also found to affect domestic firms’ exporting. Sun (2009; 2010; 2012) finds 
significant export spillover from foreign firms in China, which is the focus of this 
study. 
 
Conceptually, researchers have identified three channels through which the presence 
of foreign firms (foreign entry) can affect domestic firms: backward and forward 
linkages, labour mobility, and demonstration and competition effects (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 1998). Domestic firms can benefit from a linkage to foreign firms by being 
local suppliers and/or customers of foreign firms. Well-trained employees in foreign 
firms can move to domestic firms or establish their own business, taking with them 
the skills that they obtained in foreign firms. Domestic firms can learn from and 
imitate foreign firms, and, indeed, they may be forced to do so as a result of the 
increased competition due to foreign entry. Through these three channels, domestic 
firms are affected by foreign entry, and as a result, they may change their advertising 
behaviour. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised into six sections. In Section 2, we survey previous 
studies on advertising determinants; in Section 3, we model firm advertising 
behaviour in a monopolistically competitive market and develop our hypothesis; in 
Section 4, we deploy the econometric model; in Section 5, we present the data; in 
Section 6, we discuss the empirical findings; and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
The role of market structure in advertising behaviour has been part of an ongoing 
debate, as argued by Leahy (1997). Researchers test the impact of market structure on 
advertising by regressing the advertising intensity (i.e. the advertising-sales ratio) 
against such measures of market structure as the Herfindahl index (see, for example, 
Greer, 1971; Sutton, 1974; Strickland and Weiss, 1976; Martin, 1979; and Buxton et 
al., 1984). 
 
Willis and Rogers (1998), using data on 58 US food and tobacco markets, find a J-
shaped relationship between industry advertising intensity and market structure, as 
measured by the four-firm concentration ratio. Lee (2002) also finds a nonlinear 
relationship between industry advertising intensity and market structure, as measured 
by the Herfindahl index and the three-firm concentration ratio, in 426 five-digit 
Korean manufacturing industries. 
 
Some studies emphasise the strategic interaction among firms’ advertising 
expenditures (see for example Slade, 1995; and Zhao, 2000; Banerjee and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2003; Depken and Snow, 2008). Strategic interaction implies that 
one firm’s advertising affects another firm’s advertising behaviour. However, to some 
extent, such strategic interaction is captured by the market structure. In a more 
competitive market, it is difficult to imagine the existence of strategic interaction in 
advertising behaviour. 
 
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) show that to maximise profit, a monopolist will choose 
an advertising intensity such that it is equal to the ratio of the advertising elasticity to 
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price elasticity. The Dorfman-Steiner model implies that profitability is another factor 
that affects advertising behaviour; this has been tested by a number of empirical 
studies. A positive relationship between profitability, measured as the price-cost 
margin, and advertising is found by Comanor and Wilson (1967), Willis and Rogers 
(1998), Oustapassidis et al. (2000), and Lee (2002). 
 
Several studies focus on the impact of the firm’s financial position on advertising. 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009) find that new equity issue positively affects firm 
advertising expenditure, whereas Fee et al. (2009) find a significant positive 
relationship between firm advertising expenditures and contemporaneous foreign cash 
flow in the US. Grullon et al. (2006) show that a firm’s financial leverage has a 
‘dampening’ effect on its advertising intensity. 
 
Market size and market growth are often used as control variables in empirical studies 
(Willis and Rogers, 1998; Mavrommati and Papadopoulos, 2005). Willis and Rogers 
(1998) find that these two factors do not significantly affect advertising intensity in 
the US processed food and tobacco markets in 1987, whereas significant positive 
impacts are found by Mavrommati and Papadopoulos (2005) in the Greek food 
industry from 1990 to 1997. Mavrommati and Papadopoulos (2005) also emphasise 
the role of intangible capital in advertising behaviour. Using five-digit food industry 
data from 1990 to 1997, they find that intangible capital positively affects advertising 
intensity. 
 
Demand-side factors also play a role. Meisel (1979) finds that demand-side factors 
such as the importance of auxiliary services, reliance on professional advisers, and 
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consumer experience with a product class significantly affected advertising intensity 
among convenience goods in the US in 1974. Srinivasan et al. (2011) examine 
whether firms spend more on advertising in times of recession by using data of 
publicly listed firms from 1969 to 2008 in the US. They find that the impact on profits 
and stock returns of advertising spending during a recession depends on the market 
share, financial leverage, and product-market profile. 
 
A few studies explore the advertising behaviour of multinational corporations. 
Immordino (2009), in modelling firm decisions on levels of production, advertising 
expenditures and cost-reducing investments, proposes the existence of a positive 
relationship between firm advertising intensity and the probability of being a 
multinational corporation, whereas Samiee et al. (2003) and Griffith et al. (2003) 
investigate the determinants of advertising standardisation in multinational 
corporations. 
 
In summary, a number of previous studies have explored the determinants of firm 
advertising behaviour. These studies use either industry-level data or firm-level data 
with small sample sizes from countries other than China. This paper instead 
investigates firm advertising behaviour using a large dataset in China: a rapidly 
growing economy. Nevertheless, we draw explanatory variables from these existing 
studies in our subsequent empirical exercises. Although several studies explore the 
advertising behaviour of multinational corporations (FDI), none of the studies, to the 
best of our knowledge, address the impact of foreign entry (FDI) on domestic firms’ 
advertising intensity. This paper intends to fill this gap. 
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3. The Model 
In this section, we show that foreign entry can affect domestic firms’ advertising 
behaviour in a monopolistically competitive model, and develop the hypothesis for 
the subsequent empirical exercise. On the demand side, consumers have a constant 
elasticity of the substitution utility function, as follows: 
( ) ( )[ ] ρ
ω
ρ ωωω
1
∫ Ω∈= dqBU  , 
where Ω denotes the set of all available goods; q denotes the quantity of goods; and B 
is the brand image. A higher brand image increases the consumer’s utility. All goods 
are substitutes for each other (0 < ρ < 1), with a constant elasticity of substitution of 
1/(1- ρ) among them. 
 
Consumer utility maximisation yields the demand function: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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1  is a measure of aggregate demand level, 
which is exogenous to individual producers as they are small in size relative to the 
whole industry, such that their individual impact is negligible; and R is the consumer 
income. The demand function indicates that brand image positively affects demand. 
As firms can boost their brand image by increasing their advertising expenditures (see, 
for example,Clark et al., 2009), it also implies that advertising positively affects 
demand. A number of empirical studies have found this positive impact (see, for 
example, Rojas and Peterson, 2008; Zheng and Kaiser, 2008). 
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On the production side, there is a continuum of firms in the industry, each producing 
one variety of differentiated goods. Among these firms, there are γ (0 < γ < 1) 
proportion of foreign-invested firms. Firms discover their productivity upon entry to 
the industry, and then choose the advertising expenditure and price of their products 
to maximise profits. Firms’ advertising expenditure creates their brand image in the 
following way: 
( ) βγ abB = , 0 < β < 1 and β + ρ < 1 ,     (2) 
where firms invest a units of its outputs in advertising and 0<∂∂ γb . The presence of 
foreign firms has a negative impact on brand image due to the competition effect from 
foreign firms ( 0<∂∂ γb ). An increase in advertising expenditure will boost the brand 
image, subject to a decreasing marginal return. A number of previous empirical 
studies have found such a positive relationship between perceived brand image and 
advertising expenditure (see, for example, Kirmani, 1990; Kirmani, 1997; and 
Moorthy and Zhao, 2000). 
 
The production process involves both a fixed cost (F) and a linear marginal cost 
(c(γ)×q/θ, where c measures the cost of resources and θ denotes firm productivity). 
The presence of foreign firms (γ) drives up the cost of resources, namely, 0>∂∂ γc . 
θ is a Melitz (2003) style productivity, which firms discover from a prior distribution 
over the support (0,+∞) upon entry into the industry. 
 
The associated density function is g(θ, γ), and 0<∂∂ γg . The presence of foreign 
firms generates positive productivity spillovers, such that firms are more likely to 
discover a higher θ in an industry with a higher level of γ (i.e., the distribution of θ 
when γ is high first-order stochastic dominates the distribution when γ is low). 
 10 
Production technology is cost-reducing, and a higher realisation of θ implies a lower 
marginal cost of production. Firm profit can then be written as follows: 
( )
FaabpAcabAp
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β
ρρρ
β
ρρ
ρ
θ
θ
1
2
1
2
1
2
211
1
1
2,
 ,
 
where we assume a linear cost of advertising  and the second equality is obtained by 
plugging in the demand function (equation 1) and brand image creation function 
(equation 2). 
 
A firm chooses advertising expenditure and price level to maximise its profit. The 
first-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows: 
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which suggest that advertising positively affects price. From the FOCs, we can solve 
for optimal price level and advertising expenditure, as follows: 
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A firm’s optimal advertising intensity can therefore be defined as: 
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where λ denotes firm advertising intensity. 
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If we plug equations (3) and (4) into the profit function, we can obtain the optimal 
profit as: 
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where the superscript * denotes the optimal level of profit. A firm will exit the 
industry if ∏* < 0, and thus will not have any advertising expenditure. Let Θ denote 
the set of θ such that firms will not exit the industry, namely Θ ≡ {θ: ∏* ≥ 0}. Note 
that Θ depends on the level of foreign presence (γ). Then we can write the expected 
advertising intensity as: 
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Equation (6) suggests that foreign presence (γ) affects the domestic firm’s expected 
advertising intensity through its impact on the cost of resources (c) and brand image 
creation (b), the productivity spillovers, and its impact on the Θ (the set of θ such that 
a firm will not exit). From equation (6), we then set up the following hypothesis: 
The expected firm advertising intensity depends on firm and 
industry characteristics as in equation (6). In particular, the 
presence of foreign firms affects expected advertising intensity 
through its impact on the cost of resources, brand image creation, 
and productivity spillovers and its impact on firms’ exit 
behaviour. 
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4. Econometric Specification 
To explore the determinants of firm advertising intensity and the role of foreign entry, 
we operationalise equation (6) by setting up the following model: 
( )
εααααα
αααα
+++++
++++=
dindustryfeherfindahlherfindahlownership
ityprofitabilationdiversificfirmsizeADINT
87
2
654
3210 ln  , (7) 
where ε denotes the error term, and the definitions of the other variables are set out in 
Table 1. In equation (7), we capture the fixed cost of production and cost of resources 
in equation (6) by a set of firm characteristics (namely firm size, diversification, 
profitability, and ownership structure). In addition, following previous studies, we 
also include the Herfindahl index to capture the impact of market structure, and a set 
of two-digit industry dummy variables to allow firms to have different advertising 
intensities in different industries. 
 
Advertising is a risky and sunk investment. Larger firms are usually more capable of 
paying for advertising expenses due to the lumpiness of the costs of advertising. 
Therefore firm size is expected to affect positively a firm’s advertising intensity. 
Advertising also serves a pure informational function. The more new types of 
products a firm produces (i.e. the more diversified a firm is), the more necessary it is 
to advertise. Hence, we expect firm diversification to affect positively advertising 
intensity. 
 
Due to the sunk nature of advertising, a more profitable firm can afford to advertise 
more intensively, as it has greater cash flow to finance the advertising, which 
otherwise will be hard to finance through external sources (namely, the capacity 
effect). In addition, a firm’s higher profitability may suggest that it is faced with less 
elastic demand, which in turn leads to more intensive advertising (namely, the 
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Dorfman-Steiner effect). Therefore conceptually we expect firm profitability to affect 
advertising behaviour positively. 
 
In equation (7), we also include a dummy variable – whether a firm is privately 
owned or state and collectively owned – to allow these two types of firms to have 
different advertising behaviour. On the one hand, state and collectively owned firms 
are likely to have better access to financing from the state and collectively owned 
banks, which in turn promotes their capacity to advertise. On the other, compared 
with privately owned firms, being state and collectively owned can mean they have 
less incentive to advertise. Therefore ownership conceptually affects advertising 
behaviour, with the direction of such impact being less clear. 
 
As for market structure, a number of previous studies have shown that it affects 
advertising behaviour. In a more concentrated industry, the dominant firms are more 
capable of paying advertising expenses and have less spillover effect in their 
advertising, and thus tend to advertise more intensively. On the other hand, an 
industry with higher levels of concentration may have less vigorous competition, 
including advertising competition. In a more competitive (less concentrated) industry, 
competition will encourage firms to advertise, and firms may use advertising to create 
entry barriers. Thus, the market structure, captured by the Herfindahl index, affects 
firm advertising behaviour conceptually, but the direction of such impact is not clear. 
In equation (7), we include the squared term of the Herfindahl index to capture the 
possible nonlinearity found by previous studies. 
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The presence of foreign firms is expected to generate an impact on advertising 
intensity through four channels: its impact on the costs of resources, brand image, and 
productivity spillovers and its impact on the firm exit behaviour, as shown in Section 
3. 
 
In estimating equation (7), it shall be noted that some explanatory variables can be 
endogenous. Firm size is likely to be endogenous. On the one hand bigger firms are 
more likely to advertise; on the other hand, firms that are more likely to advertise tend 
to be larger: Advertising promotes firm growth. It is also likely that foreign entry is 
more likely to occur in industries where firms advertise more intensively, and thus 
foreign entry can be endogenous. Similarly, the diversification, profitability and 
Herfindahl index may be endogenous as well. 
 
Later in the next section, we find that compared with non-advertising firms, 
advertising firms on average have different sizes, diversification, and profitability and 
are located in industries with a higher Herfindahl index and greater foreign entry, 
suggesting that they may be endogenous. Some previous studies also find evidence of 
endogeneity. For example, Grullon et al. (2004) find that firms with greater 
advertising expenditure have a greater number of investors and better liquidity of their 
common stock. 
 
In consideration of the endogeneity issue, we use instrumental variables (IV) in the 
later regressions. The excluded instruments we use include the number of times that a 
firm exports in the three-year period (2005–2007), export intensity, age, capital 
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intensity, the number of firms in a four-digit industry, the number of exporting firms 
in a four-digit industry, and the sales in a four-digit industry. 
 
For the excluded instruments to be valid, they need to be correlated with the 
endogenous variables and not correlated with the error term in equation (7). 
Firms’ exporting behaviour, not surprisingly, is correlated with the endogenous 
variables. For example, exporting promotes firm growth. Since exporting is carried 
out to service foreign markets, we do not expect it to affect advertising decisions in 
the domestic market, conditional on the right-hand side variables in equation (7) – that 
is, it is not correlated with the error term. Therefore instruments that utilise firm 
exporting behaviour (for example, the number of exporting firms in a four-digit 
industry) are valid. 
 
In addition, it appears reasonable to expect that a firm’s decision on advertising 
intensity does not depend on the year in which the business started (that is, its age) 
and capital intensity. Therefore they are not correlated with the error term in equation 
(7). Besides, firm age and capital intensity are likely to be correlated with the 
endogenous variables. For example, firm age is correlated with firm size as a firm 
grows across time. The capital intensity is likely to influence diversification in that a 
more capital intensive firm is generally more capable of producing new types of 
products.  
 
Conditional on the market structure and industry effect (namely the industry dummy 
variables), we also do not expect the number of firms and sales in a four-digit industry 
to affect firm advertising intensity – that is, they will not be correlated with the error 
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term. In addition, they are likely to influence the endogenous variables. For example, 
FDI tends to flow into industries with bigger markets, which is captured by the 
number of firms and sales in the industries. Later in the two-stage IV regressions, by 
examining the first-stage regressions where the endogenous variables are regressed 
against the exogenous variables, we find that these excluded instruments are indeed 
correlated with the endogenous variables. 
 
5. The Data 
Equation (7) is estimated using a comprehensive firm-level dataset from 2005 to 2007, 
which was collected by the China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for the 
‘Industry’ section of the China Statistical Yearbook. The dataset covers the whole 
manufacturing sector (480 four-digit industries3 with an average number of firms in a 
four-digit industry being 550), and accounts for over 85 per cent of China’s total 
industrial output.4 A number of previous studies have utilised similar data to 
investigate different aspects of the Chinese industrial economy: for example, Hu et al. 
(2005) on R&D and technology transfer, Jefferson et al. (2008) on productivity 
growth, and Sun (2009; 2010) on export spillovers of FDI. 
 
Following Jefferson et al. (2008), we exclude the following firms: (1) those firms that 
employed fewer than eight workers, as such firms may not have reliable accounting 
systems; (2) those that reported negative net values of fixed assets and advertising 
expenditures, as well as non-positive outputs, value added, and wages. To focus on 
                                               
3 Firms are classified into the four-digit industries by their main business activities. 
4 Note that as the dataset does not cover all firms in the manufacturing sector there may be a selection 
effect, a common issue facing similar studies. 
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exploring the impact of foreign entry on domestic firms, we also exclude firms that 
have foreign ownership (i.e., firms with foreign capital).5 
 
We then use the producer price index for manufactured goods obtained from the 
China Statistical Yearbook 2008 to deflate monetary variables such as sales to the 
2005 price. Some variables are reported directly in the dataset, such as firm size 
(number of employees), whereas the rest are calculated from the dataset. For example, 
the diversification variable is calculated as the proportion of the value of a firm’s new 
products6 in its total output, both of which are directly reported in the dataset. 
 
Although we focus on domestic firms, the industry-level variables (the Herfindahl 
index and foreign entry) are constructed to include foreign firms. For example, the 
Herfindahl index is the sum of squared market share of both domestic and foreign 
firms in the four-digit industries. The industry-level variables are constructed at the 
four-digit level, into which firms are classified according to their principal business 
activities. As the Herfindahl index is measured on a national basis, it does not capture 
the impact of the fact that some industries have high per-unit transport costs and are 
more likely to be local. This impact is captured by the industry dummy variables 
included in subsequent regressions. 
 
                                               
5 Although foreign firms are defined as firms with foreign capital, over 88 per cent of them have a 
share of foreign capital in their total capital that is greater than 30 per cent, and over 77 per cent of 
them have a share higher that is greater than 50 per cent. 
6 Note that as the value of new products is reported in monetary value in the dataset, it is comparable 
across industries and regions. 
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After constructing the variables for 2005, 2006, and 2007, we then take a three-year 
average of these variables, which are later used in the regression. In addition, to avoid 
the undesired impact of outliers, we exclude observations that lie outside four 
standard deviations from the sample mean for the variables of advertising intensity 
and profitability. It shall be noted that including these firms does not significantly 
change the regression results. 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics.7 The first observation is that the data cover a 
large number of firms: 238,126 firms. Second, on average firms only spend 0.05 per 
cent of their sales revenue in advertising, with a maximum advertising intensity of just 
3 per cent. In addition, 78 per cent of firms do not advertise. This is in significant 
contrast with firms in western economies – for example, in Comanor and Wilson’s 
(1967) sample of US consumer goods industries, firms on average spent 3.3 per cent 
of their sales revenue on advertising.8 This difference can be attributed to different 
stages of economic development between China and more-developed western 
economies. 
 
Third, there exist significant variations across all variables. For example, the standard 
deviation of advertising intensity is four times its mean. Fourth, the market structure 
(Herfindahl index) is very competitive on average, but it displays significant variance. 
The standard deviation of the Herfindahl index is higher than its mean, and the most 
concentrated industry has a Herfindahl index as high as 0.72, which is close to 
monopoly. 
<insert Table 2 here> 
                                               
7 The correlations among explanatory variables are also low. 
8 We thank the editor for pointing this out. 
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Fifth, for the foreign entry variable, we have three measurements: the share of the 
output of all foreign-invested firms in a four-digit industry; the share of foreign-
invested firms from non-Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (non-HMT) regions; and 
the share of foreign-invested firms from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT). 
These three measurements allow us to investigate the impact of different sources of 
foreign entry. The HMT investment is different from non-HMT investment in that 
firms of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan share a culture similar to that of domestic 
firms. 
 
It is also likely that domestic firms first go to Hong Kong and invest back into the 
domestic market (so-called round-trip investment) to take advantage of the tax 
privilege. Additionally, investments from non-HMT are generally perceived to 
possess a higher level of technology. Previous empirical studies have found varying 
impacts of these two sources of foreign investment (see, for example, Li et al., 2001; 
and Buckley et al., 2007). Foreign entry, on average, is at a significant level, as 
approximately 31 per cent of the industry outputs are produced by foreign-invested 
firms. 
 
Since firms generally spend a small proportion of their sales revenue on advertising 
and a large proportion of firms do not advertise, we further explore whether there 
exists a difference between advertising and non-advertising firms. Table 3 reports a 
comparison of advertising and non-advertising firms in both the consumer goods 
industries9 and the industrial goods industries. Advertising firms appear to exhibit 
                                               
9 Industries with two-digit industry codes less than 25. 
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different characteristics from non-advertising firms. On average advertising firms are 
bigger, more diversified, more profitable, and located in industries with higher levels 
of concentration and higher levels of foreign entry than is true for non-advertising 
firms. 
<insert Table 3 here> 
 
This pattern also hints that firm size, diversification, profitability, Herfindahl index 
and foreign entry may be endogenous, in that if they are exogenous (namely, there is 
no reverse causality from advertising to these variables), we will not observe the 
difference between advertising and non-advertising firms. It can also be observed that 
non-advertising firms are more likely to be privately owned – which, instead of 
suggesting advertising affects ownership structure, reflects the fact that privately 
owned firms are smaller than their state and collectively owned counterparts and thus 
have less capacity to advertise. On average, privately owned firms employ 125 
workers, while state and collectively owned firms employ 285 workers. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
As the dependent variable (advertising intensity) in equation (7) is truncated between 
0 and 1, we use the Tobit estimator to estimate equation (7). Tables 4 and 5 report the 
regression results. We first assume that the explanatory variables in equation (7) are 
exogenous (Tobit [1] in Table 4). Nevertheless, as discussed above, it is possible that 
some explanatory variables are endogenous. Therefore we use the two-step IV Tobit 
estimator to estimate equation (7), and conduct a Wald test of exogeneity of 
endogenous explanatory variables. The Wald test obtains a test statistic of 2324.62, 
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which rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 1 per cent level. Therefore, the 
two-step IV Tobit regressions are more appropriate. 
 
The dataset covers both consumer goods industries and industrial goods industries. 
Conceptually, it can be expected that firms advertise more in consumer goods 
industries as compared to industrial goods industries, and the impact of foreign 
presence on advertising is stronger in consumer goods industries than in industrial 
goods industries.10 In the consumer goods industries, the average advertising intensity 
is 0.051 per cent, while it is 0.0498 per cent for the industrial goods industries. 
 
Therefore, we test whether it is appropriate to separate the sample into the consumer 
goods and industrial goods industries. To do so, we generate a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a firm belongs to the consumer goods industries and run a two-
stage IV Tobit regression where the dummy is interacted with all explanatory 
variables. Then we test the joint significance of the dummy and its interaction terms, 
which, if jointly significant, suggests that firms in these two types of industries have 
significantly different advertising behaviour, and thus it is appropriate to separate the 
sample. The test statistic we obtain is 198.63, which is significant at the five per cent 
level. Thus the interpretations in the following will be based on the two-step IV Tobit 
regression results of the separated sample. 
 
6.1 Determinants of firm advertising intensity 
Table 4 reports the regression results where foreign entry is measured as the output 
share of foreign firms from all sources, while Table 5 presents the regression results 
                                               
10 We thank the editor for pointing this out. 
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that separate foreign firms into two different sources, namely those from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan regions and those from the other regions. In both tables, we report 
the results for consumer goods and industrial goods industries separately. In addition, 
since the IV Tobit regressions are more appropriate than the Tobit regressions that 
assume exogeneity of explanatory variables, the interpretation in this section will be 
based on IV Tobit regressions. 
 
Regarding the role of foreign entry in domestic firms’ advertising behaviour, namely 
the point estimates of coefficient of foreign entry, two features can be observed from 
Tables 4 and 5: First, most regressions yield a significant point estimate, suggesting 
that foreign entry indeed significantly affects domestic firms’ advertising intensity. In 
the consumer goods industries, the impact is positive, while in contrast it is negative 
in the industrial goods industries.  
 
As in Section 2, foreign entry affects domestic firms through different channels. For 
example on the one hand it drives up the cost of resources, while on the other hand it 
generates productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Therefore the net impact on 
domestic firms’ optimal advertising intensity can be either positive or negative, 
depending on the relative magnitude of its impacts in the different channels. Later in 
the robustness analysis, where we carry out regressions by industries, we also find 
positive impact in some industries and negative impact in the other industries.  
 
Second, the point estimates in Table 5 exhibit some variations in the magnitude. 
These variations arise due to the difference in the nature of foreign investments of the 
HMT and non-HMT regions. HMT firms share a similar culture with domestic firms 
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and are more export-oriented, whereas foreign investment from the non-HMT regions 
is more domestic market-oriented (Wang et al., 2009). Furthermore, HMT firms are 
more labour-intensive, whereas the non-HMT firms have higher technological 
capabilities (Wei and Liu, 2006). Compared with the non-HMT firms, HMT firms are 
less responsive to local labour quality and technology capability (Wang et al., 2009). 
Given these differences, it is not surprising to find the two exert different impacts on 
domestic firms’ advertising intensity.11 
 
Firm size and new product diversification exert significant and positive impacts on 
domestic firms’ advertising intensity in all regressions. The positive impact of firm 
size is consistent with our prior expectation, and not surprisingly, diversification (the 
share of new types of products in a firm’s total output) positively affects advertising 
intensity, as firms require more advertising to sell their new products. Firms’ 
ownership status also affects their advertising behaviour. In Tables 4 and 5, the 
estimated coefficient of ownership is significantly positive in the industrial goods 
industries and significantly negative in consumer goods industries, suggesting that 
privately owned domestic firms have different advertising behaviour than their state 
and collectively owned counterparts, ceteris paribus. 
 
As for profitability, the estimated coefficients in both the aggregate and separate 
samples are significantly positive, and the positive estimates continue to hold when 
we use different measures of foreign entry (Table 5). As discussed above, the 
                                               
11 More discussions on the difference between HMT and non-HMT firms can be found in Wei and Liu 
(2006) and Wang et al. (2009). 
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significantly positive impact confirms that more profitable firms are more capable of 
paying for the sunk advertising expenses and may be faced with less elastic demand.  
 
Regarding the role of market structure in firm advertising behaviour, in the aggregate 
sample, a nonlinear inverse U shape is found in the IV Tobit regression. When we 
separate the sample into consumer and industrial goods industries, the inverse U 
shape continues to hold in the consumer goods industries, while in contrast it is 
reduced to be insignificant in the industrial goods industries. In addition, when we use 
different sources of foreign entry in the regressions (Table 5),  the consumer goods 
industries continue to exhibit an inverse U shape, while for the  industrial goods 
industries, it is insignificant with non-HMT foreign entry and positive with HMT 
foreign entry. This different impact suggests that the role of market structure is not 
ubiquitous. 
 
6.2 Robustness 
In the previous section, we applied the IV Tobit estimation technique. As a robustness 
check, we also employ the IV regression, which is carried out over the sample of 
firms that have positive advertising intensity, and the IV Probit estimation, where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm advertises. 
Table 6 reports the regression results. Comparing the IV Tobit regressions (Table 4) 
with the IV Probit regressions (Table 6), we can find that generally the sign of 
estimated coefficients does not change. In contrast, there are more variations in the 
point estimate of coefficients between the IV regressions and IV Tobit regressions. 
The IV regressions are restricted to firms with positive advertising intensity, and thus 
are subject to sample selection bias. 
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Previously, foreign presence is measured as the share of the outputs of foreign firms 
in a four-digit industry, which significantly affects the advertising intensity of 
domestic firms. Some previous studies also use different measures of foreign presence, 
which capture different mechanisms of spillovers (see, for example, Wei and Liu, 
2006). To determine whether our findings are robust to alternative measures of 
foreign presence, we re-run the regressions using the shares of employees, shares of 
assets, and number of foreign firms in a four-digit industry as measures of foreign 
presence, respectively. The estimated coefficients of foreign presence are all 
significantly positive in the consumer goods industries and significantly negative in 
the industrial goods industries, confirming the robustness to different measures of 
foreign presence.12 
 
The regressions in Section 6.1 are estimated over the whole manufacturing sector. In 
addition, we also estimate equation (7) over each of the 29 two-digit industries 
separately. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficients display variations across 
different industries, as advertising has a differing degree of importance for firms in 
different industries and foreign presence may vary significantly across industries due 
to governmental policies. For the coefficients of foreign presence, the point estimate 
ranges from −0.0408 to 0.3302, with an average of 0.0189 and a median of 0.0021. 
Among the 29 industries, 10 industries have significantly positive estimates, 15 
industries obtain insignificant estimates, and the remaining four industries have 
significantly negative estimates. 
                                               
12 The results, including those of regressions by industries, are not reported here to save space. They are, 
however, available upon request. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper explores the determinants of adverting intensity at the firm level with a 
focus on the role of foreign entry. In a monopolistically competitive market with 
heterogeneous firms, we show that foreign entry affects the advertising intensity of 
domestic firms through four channels: its impact on the cost of resources, brand image, 
and productivity spillovers and its impact on firm exit behaviour. 
 
We then test the theoretical model using a comprehensive firm-level dataset of 
manufacturing sector from China. Three major findings can be drawn from the 
empirical exercises. First, firms’ advertising behaviour appears to be different in the 
consumer goods and industrial goods industries, in that the estimated coefficients are 
different in regressions of consumer goods industries and industrial goods industries. 
Second, firm diversification positively affects advertising intensity, which is robust 
across different regressions. Third, foreign entry is found to affect positively domestic 
firms’ advertising intensity in the consumer goods industries and affect negatively 
advertising intensity in the industrial goods industries. The source of foreign entry 
also plays a role, as foreign entry from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan exerts an 
impact on the advertising intensity of domestic firms that is different from that of 
foreign entry from other regions.  
 
Our findings provide a better understanding of firm advertising behaviour and present 
significant implications for both business managers and policy makers. For policy 
makers, foreign entry (or FDI) significantly affects domestic advertising intensity, 
which appears to be pro-competitive; therefore, it is reasonable to promote foreign 
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entry. For managers of domestic firms, foreign entry is a challenge to which they can 
respond by reducing their production costs and adjusting their advertising. 
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Table 1 Definition of Variables 
Variables Definition 
ADINT Firm advertising intensity: the proportion of advertising 
expenditure in sales. 
firmsize Firm size: the number of employees. 
diversification New product diversification: the percentage of a firm's new types 
of products (in Chinese Yuan) in its total output (in Chinese 
Yuan). 
profitability Firm profitability: the ratio of profits divided by total sales. 
ownership Firm ownership structure: a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if a firm is privately owned and 0 if a firm is state and collectively 
owned. 
herfindahl Herfindahl index: equal to the sum of the squared market share, in 
a four-digit industry.  
fe Foreign entry/FDI/foreign presence: the proportion of the outputs 
of foreign-invested firms in a four-digit industry. 
dindustry A set of two-digit industry dummy variables. 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
advertising intensity 238126 0.0005 0.002 0 0.03 
firm size 238126 172.48 643.37 8 126855 
new product 
diversification 238126 0.04 0.14 0 1 
profitability 238126 0.04 0.06 -0.27 0.35 
ownership 238126 0.71    
Herfindahl index 238126 0.02 0.03 0.001 0.72 
foreign entry [1] 238126 0.31 0.17 0 0.99 
foreign entry [2] 238126 0.19 0.12 0 0.93 
foreign entry [3] 238126 0.13 0.09 0 0.60 
Note: [1] is measured as the proportion of the output of all foreign-invested firms 
in a four-digit industry; [2] is the output proportion of all foreign-invested firms 
from non-Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan; [3] is the output proportion of all 
foreign-invested firms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Foreign entry [2] 
and [3] are only used in regressions in Table 5. Ownership is a dummy variable, 
and thus we only report its means (i.e., the percentage of firms that take a value 
of 1). Firm size is measured as the number of employees.  
Source: Enterprise Data, NBS, 2005-7. 
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Table 3 Comparison of Advertising Firms and Non-advertising Firms 
  consumer goods industries industrial goods industries 
  advertising firms non-advertising firms advertising firms non-advertising firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
firm size 16044 290.4900 766.9044 66861 139.1151 590.8460 35822 341.7695 1202.2760 119399 124.5168 322.4323 
new product 
diversification 16044 0.0441 0.1475 66861 0.0205 0.1095 35822 0.0839 0.2045 119399 0.0296 0.1346 
profitability 16044 0.0424 0.0552 66861 0.0385 0.0549 35822 0.0450 0.0600 119399 0.0408 0.0600 
ownership 16044 0.6983   66861 0.7684   35822 0.6105  119399 0.7005  
Herfindahl 16044 0.0154 0.0285 66861 0.0115 0.0185 35822 0.0197 0.0312 119399 0.0166 0.0292 
foreign entry 16044 0.3321 0.1682 66861 0.3135 0.1585 35822 0.3227 0.1796 119399 0.2958 0.1704 
Note: Consumer goods industries are industries with two-digit industry code less than 25. 
Source: Enterprise Data, NBS, 2005-7. 
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Table 4 Regression Results 
 Tobit [1] IV Tobit [2] IV Tobit [3] IV Tobit [4] 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
firm size 0.0013*** 0.00002 0.0023*** 0.0001 0.0031*** 0.0002 0.0015*** 0.0001 
new product 
diversification 
0.0035*** 0.0001 0.0141*** 0.0021 0.0126*** 0.0035 0.0222*** 0.0022 
profitability 0.0027*** 0.0003 0.0632*** 0.0042 0.0742*** 0.0058 0.0343*** 0.0051 
ownership -0.0002*** 0.00003 0.00002 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 
Herfindahl 0.0100*** 0.0010 0.0834*** 0.0115 0.1106*** 0.0194 0.0050 0.0099 
Herfindahl2 -0.0189*** 0.0032 -0.5519*** 0.0931 -0.7822*** 0.1837 -0.0516 0.0804 
foreign entry 0.0023*** 0.0001 -0.0019*** 0.0005 0.0014** 0.0006 -0.0045*** 0.0006 
constant -0.0018*** 0.0001 -0.0018*** 0.0003 -0.0015*** 0.0004 -0.0024*** 0.0003 
Number of obs 238126  238113  82902  155211  
Wald χ2/F 271.19  8831.62  3052.89  6754.74  
Note: [1] is the Tobit regression over aggregate sample; [2] is the IV Tobit regression over aggregate sample; [3] is the IV Tobit 
regression over consumer goods industries; [4] is the IV Tobit regression over industrial goods industries; the coefficient estimate of 
industry dummy variables is not reported to save space; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Regression Results with Different Sources of Foreign Entry 
 [1] [2] 
 consumer goods industrial goods consumer goods industrial goods 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
firm size 0.0031*** 0.0002 0.0013*** 0.0001 0.0031*** 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0001 
new product 
diversification 
0.0128*** 0.0036 0.0245*** 0.0022 0.0126*** 0.0035 0.0210*** 0.0023 
profitability 0.0748*** 0.0059 0.0267*** 0.0049 0.0739*** 0.0057 0.0401*** 0.0054 
ownership -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.00005 -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001 
Herfindahl 0.1204*** 0.0194 0.0223** 0.0112 0.1062*** 0.0197 0.0006 0.0098 
Herfindahl2 -0.8821*** 0.1828 -0.1369 0.0871 -0.7270*** 0.1878 -0.0725 0.0836 
foreign entry 0.0024 0.0015 -0.0102*** 0.0013 0.0026** 0.0010 -0.0082*** 0.0011 
constant -0.0014*** 0.0004 -0.0025 0.0003 -0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0024*** 0.0003 
Number of obs 82902  155211  82902  155211  
Wald χ2 2944.95  6620.55  3119.02  6622.28  
Note: [1] is the IV Tobit regression where foreign entry is measured as the output share of foreign-invested firms from non-Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan regions; [2] is the IV Tobit regression where foreign entry is measured as the output share of foreign-invested firms 
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan regions; the coefficient estimate of industry dummy variables is not reported to save space; ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Alternative Regression Results 
 consumer goods industries industrial goods industries 
 [1] [2] [1] [2] 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
firm size 0.0004** 0.0002 0.6266*** 0.0329 -0.0006*** 0.0001 0.6058*** 0.0347 
new product 
diversification 
-0.0182*** 0.0030 5.1989*** 0.7035 0.0041** 0.0017 4.1705*** 0.5629 
profitability 0.0321*** 0.0085 14.9614*** 1.1635 -0.0169*** 0.0046 15.5698*** 1.2816 
ownership -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0204 0.02122 0.00003 0.0001 0.0546*** 0.01314 
Herfindahl -0.0370** 0.0169 27.1984*** 3.8220 0.0035 0.0090 3.9666 2.4930 
Herfindahl2 0.2359* 0.1245 -206.7818*** 36.3576 0.1558** 0.0794 -57.9469*** 20.2406 
foreign entry 0.0044*** 0.0006 -0.1609 0.1228 0.0026*** 0.0005 -1.6761*** 0.1430 
constant 0.0015*** 0.0005 -0.0043 0.0860 0.0001 0.0003 0.1936** 0.0844 
Number of obs 16044  82902  35822  155211  
Wald χ2 918.18  2142.4  1159.21  6783.78  
Note: [1] is the IV regression over firms with positive advertising intensity; [2] is IV Probit estimation where the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm advertises; the coefficient estimate of industry dummy variables is not reported to save space; 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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